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Abstract
We provide an end-to-end differentially private spectral algorithm for learning LDA, based on matrix/tensor de-
compositions, and establish theoretical guarantees on utility/consistency of the estimated model parameters. The
spectral algorithm consists of multiple algorithmic steps, named as “edges”, to which noise could be injected to ob-
tain differential privacy. We identify subsets of edges, named as “configurations”, such that adding noise to all edges
in such a subset guarantees differential privacy of the end-to-end spectral algorithm. We characterize the sensitivity
of the edges with respect to the input and thus estimate the amount of noise to be added to each edge for any required
privacy level. We then characterize the utility loss for each configuration as a function of injected noise. Overall, by
combining the sensitivity and utility characterization, we obtain an end-to-end differentially private spectral algorithm
for LDA and identify the corresponding configuration that outperforms others in any specific regime. We are the first
to achieve utility guarantees under the required level of differential privacy for learning in LDA. Overall our method
systematically outperforms differentially private variational inference.
1 Introduction
Topic modeling has been used extensively in document categorization, social sciences, machine translation and so
forth. Learning topic modeling involves projecting high dimensional observations (documents) to a lower dimensional
latent structure (topics), and outputting a model parameter estimation that describes the generative process of observed
documents. In this paper, we focus on a popular topic model, Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [5]. Popular methods
to learning LDA, such as variational inference [5], optimizes over a lower bound of the likelihood and is susceptible
to local optima due to the non-convexity and high-dimensionality of the likelihood bound.
To provide a guaranteed consistent learning algorithm for LDA, tensor decomposition (spectral method) using
method of moments is proposed [1, 3]. For linearly independent topics, the tensor decomposition spectral algorithm [1,
3] guarantees consistent recovery of the topic-word distribution (i.e. LDA model parameters), if the third order data
moment tensor, which denotes the expected co-occurrence of triplets of words in a document, is uniquely decomposed.
A state-of-the-art tensor decomposition algorithm, called the simultaneous power method [23], has been proven to
recover the true components of tensors with orthogonal components. Therefore, a whitening procedure that transforms
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the third order data moment tensor into a tensor with orthogonal components, which in turn can be decomposed using
the simultaneous power method, is used. The whitening procedure involves matrix decomposition on the second order
data moment matrix, which denotes the expected co-occurrence of pairs of words in a document.
Overall, we have an end-to-end spectral learning algorithm for LDA, based on matrix/tensor decomposition. This
algorithm is guaranteed to consistently recover LDA’s model parameters. We introduce an algorithmic flow graph
that illustrates our spectral learning algorithm in figure 1, where each node corresponds to an intermediate objective
required for a final output estimation and each edge ∈ {ei}9i=0 denotes certain operation required as a step of the
spectral learning algorithm.
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Figure 1: Algorithmic flow of end-to-end spectral learning algorithm to learning LDA topic model.
Although the spectral algorithm enjoys a provable guarantee in learning LDA, the output of this method could leak
sensitive information, which limits the applicability of LDA in legal, financial and medical domains. For instance,
consider a situation in which a sensitive document corpusD is kept hidden, but an adversary can obtain the output of
the spectral algorithm onD. If an additional document d is added to the corpus, and the output changes for one topic t,
an adversary can then infer that d is related to t. Differential privacy (DP) [10] is a general framework for quantifying
leakage of private information from an algorithm. A generic method to convert an algorithm A to be differentially
private is to add sufficient noise to A’s output.
The goal of this work is: (1) to introduce the first differentially private algorithm that is guaranteed to recover high
quality estimates (guarantee consistency) of the LDA model parameters; and (2) to identify a mechanism that suffers
least from utility loss under some level of differential privacy.
To achieve goal (1), we consider injecting noise to a subset E of edges {ei}9i=0 that separates the input and the
output (a cut). When E is a cut, differentially privately releasing all nodes preceding the edges in E guarantees the
overall differential privacy according to the composition theorem and the closure to post processing. For instance,
adding noise to E = (e0, e2) guarantees no privacy as the non-private information could flow to the output through
the path below. However adding noise to the output {e9}, for example, guarantees overall differential privacy as long
as the global sensitivity of {e9} is bounded1. We call such a subset of edges as a “configuration” if adding noise to all
edges in this configuration guarantees differential privacy of the overall algorithm. Four configurations are identified
as shown in Section6 “Differentially Private Spectral Algorithm”.
The amount of noise needed to achieve same level of differential privacy is different across edges as the sensitivities
of edges vary, and thus utility losses caused by injecting the noise vary across edges. Depending on which configuration
we choose, we may have quite different utility measures. To obtain goal (2) and solve the problem of where to add the
noise for least utility loss to guarantee (ǫ,δ)-differential privacy, we characterize the sensitivity of all the edges {ei}9i=0
and utility bounds for all configurations with respect to the input. We then identify corresponding configuration that
outperforms others in any regime.
Related Works In Appendix 2, we provide context on popular LDA methods, and provide a primer on differential
privacy and tensor decomposition.
Comparison of ourmethod against differentially private variational inference. The proposed approach is advan-
tageous over differentially private VI as it (1) retains consistency guarantees, (2) is computationally more efficient, (3)
1The global sensitivity is not bounded for {e9}, unfortunately.
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achieves higher accuracy in synthetic experiments, moreover, (4) does not require performing composition across mul-
tiple iterations. However, the proposed approach (1) is less data efficient and (2) does not report posterior uncertainty
in the parameter estimates.
Summary of Contributions
(1)We illustrate the computation graph of our spectral algorithm for LDA in figure 1, based on which we list subsets of
edges as configurations, on which noise could be added to guarantee differential privacy according to the composition
theorem.
(2) We bound the sensitivity of releasing various intermediate quantities on the computational graph, which leads to
a number of methods for achieving both the pure-ǫ-DP and the approximate (ǫ, δ)-DP. In the cases when the global
sensitivity is unbounded, we come up with a data-dependent DP that exploits the small local sensitivity.
(3) We achieve consistency guarantee of the algorithm by characterizing the utility loss guarantees between the true
parameters and the differentially private parameters we obtain. This result is stronger than traditional utility loss
between the non-differentially private parameters and the differentially private parameters.
(4) Overall, we introduce a systematic analysis of differentially private spectral algorithm for LDA and obtain the
regimes under which adding noise to each configuration guarantees the best performance. Using this framework, we
demonstrate multiple mechanisms, which permit differentially private algorithms whose utilities are advantageous in
different regimes as listed in Remark 14, 15 and 16.
(5) Empirical studies confirm that our method systematically outperforms differentially private variational inference.
2 A. Related Work
Wang et al. [25] establishes an impressive result of frequentist consistency and asymptotic normality of VB methods,
in which the consistency is based on the assumption of achieving the optimal variational posterior. However the
feasibility of achieving such optimal variational posterior (which requires global optimal solution over a non-convex
ELBO objective) remains unclear as the global optimality is not necessarily guaranteed.
This work focuses on LDA parameter estimation based on spectral algorithmswhich, unlike EM-based algorithms[18,
17], guarantee parameter recovery if a mild set of assumptions are met [1, 2]. The spectral estimation method relies on
matrix decomposition and tensor decomposition methods. Thus, differentially private PCA and tensor decomposition
are related to our objective.
Differentially private PCA is an established topic, and (ǫ, 0) differentially private PCA was achieved using the
exponential mechanism in [7, 15]. The algorithm in [15] provides guarantees but with complexity O(d6); in contrast,
[7] introduces an algorithm that is near optimal but without an analysis of convergence time. Although (ǫ, δ) differ-
ential privacy is a more loose definition of differential privacy, it leads to better utility. Comparative experimental
results show that the (ǫ, δ) PCA algorithm of [14] outperform (ǫ, 0) significantly, and [12] introduce a simple input
perturbation algorithm which achieves near optimal utility. In our work, we follow the (ǫ, δ) definition and use [12] to
obtain a differentially private matrix decomposition when needed.
Differentially private tensor decomposition is studied in [24] with an incoherence basis assumption. It is not clear
the extent to which such an assumption holds in topic modeling. Only utility bounds are proved for the top eigenvector
in [24]. The authors exclude the possibility of input perturbation as that causes the privacy parameter to be lower
bounded by the dimension (ǫ = Ω(d)) which is prohibitive. However, the same analysis on the tensor of a reduced
dimension would conclude that ǫ = Ω(k), which is acceptable for a reduced dimension whitened tensor as k ≪ d.
3 Preliminaries and Notations
Latent Dirichlet Allocation is characterized by two model parameters: α, the dirichlet parameter of the topic prior,
and µ, the topic word matrix. α parameterizes a dirichlet distribution, which determines the topic mixture in each
document, µ controls the word distribution per topic. We provide a detailed explanation of LDA in Appendix B. We
use d to denote the number of distinct words in a vocabulary,N to denote the total number of documents, k to denote
the number of topics. The topic prior Dirichlet distribution is parameterized byα = (α1, . . . , αk) and α0 =
∑k
i=1 αi.
For each document n, topic proportion is θn, document length is ln, and word frequency vector is denoted as cn. Word
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tokens are denoted by x. Let D,D′ be two datasets. We say datasets D and D′ are adjacent (denoted by D ∼ D′) if
we can formD′ by replacing exactly one document fromD.
Definition 1 ((ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy). Let A : D → Y be a randomized algorithm. If ∀D ∼ D′, ∀S ⊆ Y
P[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eǫP[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ, then A is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Definition 2 (Local / Global Sensitivity). The local sensitivity ∆f (D) := maxD′|D′∼D ‖f(D) − F (D′)‖ and the
global sensitivity ∆f := maxD∆f (D). ℓp norm corresponds to ℓp sensitivity.
In Appendix A, we review utility loss & error, the Gaussian mechanism and the composition theorem.
4 Differentially Private LDA Topic Model
The commonly used variational inference method, which optimizes over a likelihood lower bound, provides no consis-
tency guarantee due to the non-convexity of the likelihood function. To achieve a guarantee on the utility for learning
LDA, we use a spectral algorithm via matrix/tensor decompositions - the only existing method that provides a guar-
antee on the performance with enough documents. For the LDA model, we define the first, second, and third order
LDA moments in Lemma 3. Using the properties of LDA, we achieve unbiased estimators of the LDA parameters by
decomposing these moments into factors that correspond to each µi, formalized in Lemma 3. Therefore, as long as we
empirically estimate the momentsM1,M2, andM3 without bias, we obtain the model parameters α and µ via tensor
decomposition on the empirically estimated moments.
Lemma 3 (LDA moments and Moment Decompositions Recover Model Parameters). Let random variables x1,
x2 and x3 denote the first, second and third tokens in a document. Tokens are represented as one-hot encodings, i.e.,
x1 = ev if the first token is the v-th word in the dictionary. We define the first, second, and third order moments of
LDA M1, M2 and M3 as M1
def
= E[x1], M2
def
= E[x1 ⊗ x2] − α0α0+1E[x1] ⊗ E[x1] and M3
def
= E[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ x3] +
2α20
(α0+1)(α0+2)
E[x1]⊗E[x1]⊗E[x1]− 1α0+2
(
E[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗E[x3]] + E[x1 ⊗ E[x2]⊗ x3] + E[E[x1]⊗ x2 ⊗ x3]
)
. The
LDA moments relate to the model parameters α and µ through matrix/tensor decomposition as follows
M1 =
k∑
i
αi
α0
µi, M2 =
k∑
i
αi
α0(α0 + 1)
µi ⊗ µi,
M3 =
k∑
i
2αi
α0(α0 + 1)(α0 + 2)
µi ⊗ µi ⊗ µi. (1)
Proof is in Appendix E. Note that α0 is pre-specified and thus data-independent. Using the properties of LDA, the
moments are decomposed as factors shown in Lemma 3, and the factors µi correspond to the LDA model parameters
we aim to estimate. According to Lemma 3, decomposing on matrixM2 only will not result in correct recovery of µi as
there are no unique µi’s unless µi ⊥ µi′ and αi 6= αi′ . The word distributions under different topics are only linearly
independent instead of orthogonal. However, tensor decomposition onM3 will yield a unique decomposition [3].
Method of Moments & Tensor Decomposition Inspired by Lemma 3, we conclude that tensor decomposition on
M3 will result in consistent estimation of the LDA parameters α and µi. We have no access to population moments
M1,M2 andM3, but do have access to word frequency vectors cn.
To solve this problem, we empirically estimate the moments M1, M2, M3 as in Equations (5)(6)(7) given the
observations of word frequency vectors cn, and obtain the model parameters α and µ by implementing tensor decom-
position on those empirically estimated moments. In Lemma 22 in Appendix C, we prove that the empirical moment
estimators are unbiased.
The method of moments uses the property of data moments of the LDA model (in Lemma 3) to estimate the
parameters of topic model α and µi, ∀i ∈ k. The algorithm flow is depicted in Figure 1 and consists of the following
steps: (1) Using cn for document ∀n ∈ [N ], estimate Mˆ2 and Mˆ3 using equation (6) (e0 in Figure 1) and equation (7)
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(e1 in Figure 1). (2) Apply SVD on Mˆ2 to obtain an estimation of the whitening matrix Ŵ
def
= Û Σ̂−
1
2 , where Û and Σ̂
are the top k singular vectors and singular values of Mˆ2 (e2 in Figure 1). (3)Whiten the tensor T̂ = Mˆ3(Ŵ , Ŵ , Ŵ )
using multilinear operations 2 on Mˆ3 with Ŵ (e3 and e4 in Figure 1). (4) Implement tensor decomposition on the
whitened tensor T̂ and denote the resulting eigenvectors as µ¯i, ∀i ∈ [k] (e6 in Figure 1). (5) Obtain the un-whitening
matrix Ŵ † = Σ̂
1
2 Û⊤ (e5 in Figure 1). (6) Un-whiten the singular vectors to obtain LDA parameters: µ̂i ∝ (Ŵ †)⊤µ¯i
and α̂i, ∀i ∈ k (e7 and e8 in Figure 1).
Our end-to-end spectral algorithm guarantees the correct learning of topic models (see Lemma 25).
Differentially Private LDA Problem Statement We assume that the corpus of data is held by a trusted curator and
that an analyst will query for the parameters of the topic model. The curator has to output the model parameters αi, µi
in a differentially private manner with respect to the documents. While it is easy to achieve differential privacy, the
challenge is in guaranteeing high utility. We will use the Gaussian mechanism described in Proposition 18 in this paper
to achieve (ǫ, δ)-differentially private topic modeling for each of the configurations. We will compute sensitivities of
edges in each configuration in Section 5 to obtain the noise level that must be added to each edge. Our derived
sensitivity and utility loss results are demonstrated in Section6 “Differentially Private Spectral Algorithm”.
5 Sensitivity of Nodes in Algorithmic Flow
We will use ∆x to denote the sensitivity of Mˆ2 if x = 2, Mˆ3 if x = 3, T̂ if x = T̂ . A key challenge is where to add
noise in the data flow shown in Figure 1. First, we calculate the sensitivities at the different nodes of the data flow
graph. Then, we consider various options and establish the utilities for different possible noise addition configurations
in Section6 “Differentially Private Spectral Algorithm”.
In the following theorems, the exact forms of the sensitivity and the proofs are in appendix H. We note that the ℓ1
sensitivity bounds the ℓ2 sensitivity, similar to how ||x||2 ≤ ||x||1 for any given vector x. At times we only bound the
ℓ1 sensitivity which in turn bounds ℓ2.
Theorem 4 (Global sensitivity of second and third order LDA moments). Let ∆2 and ∆3 be the ℓ1 sensitivities for
Mˆ2 and Mˆ3 respectively. Both∆2 and∆3 are upper bounded by
2
N .
Theorem 5 (Local sensitivity of the whitened tensor T̂ ). The ℓ1 sensitivity of the whitened tensor T̂ , denoted as∆T̂ ,
is upper bounded by∆T̂ = O(
k1.5
N(σk(Mˆ2))1.5
).
Theorem 6 (Local sensitivity of the output of tensor decomposition µ¯i, α¯i). Let µ¯1, . . . , µ¯k and α¯1, . . . , α¯k be the
results of tensor decomposition before unwhitening. The sensitivity of µ¯i, denoted as ∆µ¯, and the sensitivity of α¯i,
denoted as∆α¯, are both upper bounded by O(
k2
γsN(σk(Mˆ2))1.5
), where γs = mini∈[k]
σi(T̂ )−σi+1(T̂ )
4 .
Theorem 7 (Local sensitivity of the final output µi, αi). The sensitivities ∆µ and ∆α of the final output are upper
bounded by O(
k2
√
σ1(Mˆ2)
γsNσ1.5k (Mˆ2)
).
Remark. The sensitivities before the whitening are O( 1N ). The whitening step increases the sensitivity by
k1.5
σk(Mˆ2)1.5
,
leading to O( k
1.5
N(σk(Mˆ2))1.5
). Further, the simultaneous power method for tensor decomposition increases the sen-
sitivity by k
0.5
γs
, leading to O( k
2
γsN(σk(Mˆ2))1.5
). The unwhitening increases the sensitivity by
√
σ1(Mˆ2), leading to
O(
k2
√
σ1(Mˆ2)
γsN(σk(Mˆ2))1.5
).
2The (i, j, k)-th entry of the multilinear operation Mˆ3(Ŵ , Ŵ , Ŵ ) is
∑
m,n,l[Mˆ3]m,n,lWm,iWn,jWl,k . Since Ŵ is a d×k matrix and Mˆ3
is a d× d× d tensor, Mˆ3(Ŵ , Ŵ , Ŵ ) is a k × k × k tensor.
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Procedure 1 (ǫ1 + ǫ
′
1 + ǫ, δ1 + δ
′
1 + δ)-Differential Privacy (DP) Noise Calibration
Input: local sensitivity of the configuration: LS, non-DP output of the configuration: f(DATA)
Output: (ǫ1 + ǫ
′
1 + ǫ, δ1 + δ
′
1 + δ)-DP output
1: σ̂k = σk(Mˆ2) + Lap(
1
Nǫ1
) ⊲ (ǫ1, 0)-DP release of σk(Mˆ2) via Laplacian mechanism
2: σ˜k = max{0, σ̂k − 2Nǫ1 log( 12δ1 )} ⊲ high probability lower bound of σ̂k: p(σ˜k < σ̂k) ≥ δ1
3: if config # > 2 then
4: γ̂s = γs + Lap(
1
Nǫ′1
) ⊲ (ǫ′1, 0)-DP release of γs via Laplacian mechanism
5: γ˜s = max{0, γ̂s − 2Nǫ′1 log(
1
2δ′1
)} ⊲ high probability lower bound of γ̂s: p(γ˜s < γ̂s) ≥ δ′1
6: obtain L˜S by substituting σk(Mˆ2) with σ˜k and substituting γs with γ˜s in LS
7: else
8: obtain L˜S by replacing σk(Mˆ2) with σ˜k in LS
9: ǫ′1 = 0, δ
′
1 = 0
10: end if
11: Return f(DATA) +N (0, L˜S2τǫ,δ) ⊲ Gaussian mechanism and τǫ,δ =
√
2 ln 1.25/δ
ǫ
5.1 Data-dependent Privacy Calibration
Theorem 5, 6 and 7 are local sensitivities, which are functions of the input data set. It is well-known that adding noise
proportional to the local sensitivity does not guarantee differential privacy as the local sensitivity may be sensitive to
adding or removing of individuals from the dataset and lead to the identification of individuals.
Two seminal solutions to this problem include the smooth sensitivity framework [16] and the propose-test-release
(PTR) framework [9]. The idea of the smooth sensitivity framework is to construct a smooth upper bound of the
local sensitivity that is insensitive and to calibrate noise with a heavier tail that satisfies certain “dilation” and “shift”
properties to achieve pure-DP. The PTR framework involves proposing bounds of the local sensitivity and testing its
validity. If the test is passed, we calibrate the noise according to the proposed test. PTR is often easier to use but can
only provide an (ǫ, δ)-DP with δ > 0.
In our problem, the smooth sensitivity itself is unbounded, thus we cannot apply the smooth sensitivity framework
naively. Instead, we use a variant of propose-test-release framework that releases a confidence bound of the local
sensitivity in a differentially private manner, and calibrates noise accordingly, similar to the idea in [6] and a more
recent example in the context of data-adaptive differentially private linear regression [26]. We formalize the idea using
the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Let LS be the ℓp local sensitivity of a function f on a fixed data set. Let L˜S obeys (ǫ1, 0)-DP and that
p[LS ≥ L˜S] ≤ δ1 (where the probability is only over the randomness in releasing L˜S). Then the algorithm releases
f(DATA) + Z(ǫ, δ, L˜S) that is (ǫ1 + ǫ, δ1 + δ)-DP, where Z(ǫ, δ, L˜S) is any way of calibrating the noise for privacy
(for Gaussian mechanism Z(ǫ, δ, L˜S) = N (0, 2L˜S
2
log(1.25/δ)
ǫ2 )).
The proof is in Appendix H.6. In our problem, the local sensitivities depend on the data only through σk(Mˆ2) and
γs. A natural idea would be to privately release σk(Mˆ2) and γs and construct a high-confidence upper bound of the
local sensitivity through a high-confidence lower bound of σk(Mˆ2) and γs. We will show the global sensitivities of
σk(Mˆ2) and σi(T̂ ) are small, and release σk(Mˆ2) and σi(T̂ ) differentially privately.
Lemma 9 (Global Sensitivity of σk(Mˆ2) and γs). The sensitivities of σk(Mˆ2) and γs are each 2/N .
The proof is in Appendix H.7.
Calibrating Noise Using Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, we describe an algorithm that guarantees (ǫ1+ ǫ
′
1+ ǫ, δ1+δ
′
1+δ2)-
DP under local sensitivity LS in Procedure 1.
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6 Differentially Private Spectral Algorithm
In Figure 1, each node corresponds to an intermediate objective required for a final output estimation and each edge
denotes certain operation required as a step of the spectral learning algorithm. We consider injecting noise to a subset
E of edges {ei}9i=0 that separates the input and the output (a cut). When E is a cut, differentially privately releasing
all nodes preceding the edges in E guarantees the overall differential privacy according to the composition theorem
and the closure to post processing. We call such a subset of edges as a “configuration” if adding noise to all edges in
this configuration guarantees differential privacy of the overall algorithm.
In this section, we denote τǫi,δi =
√
2 ln 1.25/δi
ǫi
. Further, σ˜k and γ˜s are determined by a choice of (ǫ1, δ1) and
(ǫ′1, δ
′
1) according to Procedure 1. In what follows, if noise is added to edge ei, then ǫi refers to the associated
differential privacy parameter.
Four configurations are identified.
6.1 Config. 1 (e3, e4, e8): Perturbation on Mˆ2 , Mˆ3 for private M̂3, Ŵ , Ŵ
†
In Config. 1, since (e3, e4, e8) is a cut that separates the input and the output, we add Gaussian noise N (0, 1N2 τǫ3,δ3)
on Mˆ3 to ensure (ǫ3, δ3)-DP Mˆ3 for edge e3, noise N (0, 1N2 τǫ4,δ4) on Mˆ2 to ensure (ǫ4, δ4)-DP W for edge e4, and
also noiseN (0, 1N2 τǫ8,δ8) on Mˆ2 to ensure (ǫ8, δ8)-DP W † for edge e8.
Config. 1 has a bounded global sensitivityO(1/N) and allows a pure-DP if we add Laplace noise using Laplacian
mechanism.
6.2 Config. 2 (e6, e8): Perturbation on T̂ and Mˆ2 for private T̂ , Ŵ †
In Config. 2, since (e6, e8) is a cut that separates the input and the output, we add Gaussian noise N (0, k3N2σ˜3k τǫ6,δ6)
on T̂ to ensure (ǫ1 + ǫ6, δ1 + δ6)-DP T̂ for edge e6,N (0, 1N2 τǫ8,δ8) on Mˆ2 to ensure (ǫ8, δ8)-DP W † for edge e8.
In Config. 2 the whitening matrix results from a noiseless Mˆ2, but the pseudo-inverse results from a noisy Mˆ2.
We add noise to a tensor of a smaller dimension, at the expense of an increased sensitivity by a factor of k
3/2
σ
3/2
k (Mˆ2)
.
To guarantee utility, we need ǫ6 = Ω(
γsσk(T̂ )k3/2
Nσ
3/2
k (Mˆ2)
) and ǫ8 = Ω(
√
d
(σk(Mˆ2)−σk+1(Mˆ2))N ). The dependence on
√
d still
remains however, as it originates from adding noise to Mˆ2 which is still done forW
†.
6.3 Config. 3 (e7, e8): Perturbation on µ¯i, α¯i and Mˆ2 for private µ¯,Ŵ
†
In Config. 3, since (e7, e8) is a cut that separates the input and the output, we add Gaussian noiseN (0, k4N2γ˜s2σ˜3k τǫ7,δ7)
on µ¯i and α¯i to ensure (ǫ1 + ǫ
′
1 + ǫ7, δ1 + δ
′
1 + δ7)-DP µ¯i and α¯i for edge e7, and noise N (0, 1N2 τǫ8,δ8) on Mˆ2 to
ensure (ǫ8, δ8)-DP W
† for edge e8.
This configuration adds noise to the output of the simultaneous tensor power method and thus the sensitivity after
the output of the simultaneous power iteration increases by a factor of 1γs compared to Config. 2. However, according
to utility loss guarantees in Theorem 11 and 12, the dependence on k in the last term drops from k2.5 to k2 compared
to Config. 2. This is because although the previous configuration adds noise before the decomposition at a lower
sensitivity, the error in the output grows by a factor of
√
k
γs
.
6.4 Config. 4 (e9): Perturbation on output µi, αi for private µ̂
The last option we consider is to add noise to the final output. In Config. 4, since (e9) is a cut that separates the input
and the output, we add Gaussian noise N (0, k4σ1(Mˆ2)
N2γ˜s2σ˜3k
τǫ7,δ7) on µi, αi to ensure (ǫ1 + ǫ
′
1 + ǫ9, δ1 + δ
′
1 + δ9)-DP µi,
αi for edge e9.
7
This method is arguably the simplest, as the previous configurations involve the composition of multiple differen-
tially private outputs whereas this method only adds noise to one branch. Adding noise to e9 instead of e7 means that
the noise vector increases in dimension from k to d which makes the utility loss larger.
Though it is possible to perform input perturbation, we exclude this option because the l2 sensitivity is
√
2L (where
L is the length of the longest document) which does not decay with the number of records. Therefore the utility of
input perturbation is poor even with many records.
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Figure 2: Error of our method under all configurations vs the differentially private VI over varying composite ǫ
while fixing the composite δ = 10−7 using N = 100k documents. vi-u and unnoised denote the non-differentially
private version of variational inference and our spectral algorithm. Config. 3 overlaps with config. 4 and thus is hardly
visible.
6.5 Utility Guarantees
For each configuration, we compute the noise needed to obtain (ǫ, δ) differential privacy based on sensitivity, thereby
characterizing the utility with necessary noise. The utility of each configuration is listed in Theorems 10, 11, 12 and 13.
Proofs of all utility derivations are in Appendix I.
Theorem 10 (Config. 1 Utility Loss). The utility loss
∥∥µi − µDPi ∥∥ using Config. 1 to guarantee (ǫ3+ǫ4+ǫ5, δ3+δ4+
δ5)-DP isO(
√
σ1(Mˆ2)k
γs
((
√
d
Nσk(Mˆ2)3/2
τǫ4,δ4)
3+
√
d
Nσk(Mˆ2)3/2
τǫ3,δ3)+
√
σ1(Mˆ2)d
σk(Mˆ2)N
τǫ8,δ8+
√
σ1(Mˆ2) +
√
d
N τǫ8,δ8
√
k
γs
[
(
√
d
Nσk(Mˆ2)
τǫ4,δ4)
3+
√
d
Nσk(Mˆ2)3/2
τǫ3,δ3
]
).
Theorem 11 (Config. 2 Utility Loss). The utility loss
∥∥µi − µDPi ∥∥ using Config. 2 to guarantee (ǫ1 + ǫ6 + ǫ8,
δ1 + δ6 + δ8)-DP is O(
√
σ1(Mˆ2)k2.5
γsNσ˜k3/2
τǫ6,δ6 +
√
σ1(Mˆ2)d
σk(Mˆ2)N
τǫ8,δ8 +
√
σ1(Mˆ2) +
√
d
N τǫ8,δ8
k2.5τǫ6,δ6
γsNσ˜k3/2
).
Theorem 12 (Config. 3 Utility Loss). The utility loss
∥∥µi − µDPi ∥∥ using Config. 3 to guarantee (ǫ1 + ǫ′1 + ǫ7 + ǫ8,
δ1 + δ
′
1 + δ7 + δ8)-DP is O(
√
σ1(Mˆ2)k2.5
γ˜sNσ˜
3/2
k
τǫ7,δ7 +
√
σ1(Mˆ2)d
σk(Mˆ2)N
τǫ8,δ8 +
√
σ1(Mˆ2) +
√
d
N τǫ8,δ8
k2τǫ7,δ7
γ˜sNσ˜
3/2
k
).
Theorem 13 (Config. 4 Utility Loss). The utility loss
∥∥µi − µDPi ∥∥ using Config. 4 to guarantee (ǫ1 + ǫ′1 + ǫ9,
δ1 + δ
′
1 + δ9) is O(
√
σ1(Mˆ2)dk
2
γ˜sNσ˜
3/2
k
τǫ9,δ9).
6.6 Comparison of Configurations
The utility loss is non-vacuous if the number of data points is ≥ √d, as it depends on O(√d/N). This sub-linear
sample complexity dependence on dimension outperforms other methods. We present a pairwise comparison between
the utilities of different configurations.
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Remark 14. Configuration 1 vs. 2: The utility loss in config. 1 is high compared to config. 2 as the the singular
values of Mˆ2 are on the order of
1
d . Config. 1 has a
√
d factor higher utility loss compared to config. 2. Therefore,
config. 2 is preferred over config. 1 in practice.
Remark 15. Configuration 2 vs. 3: The utility loss for config. 3 is lower than that of config. 2 by a factor of k0.5
in the last term of the utility losses, assuming the same level of differential privacy. However, config. 3 has the extra
requirement that∆3 ≤ γsσk(T̂ )2√k . Therefore the utility of config. 3 outperforms that of config. 2 only if the constraint is
met. The advantage is enlarged when k is large.
Remark 16. Configuration 3 vs. 4: The first two terms of utility loss in config. 3 are smaller than that in config. 4.
In the regime ofN >
√
d , config. 3 is preferred as the third term of config. 3 is smaller than that of config. 4.
7 Experiments
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Figure 3: Visualization of (a) the kth singular values of Mˆ2 and (b) the smallest singular value gap of T̂ using 100k
documents.
The main focus of the paper is on providing the first differentially private topic model with well understood and
theoretically guaranteed utility. We simulate documents from an LDA model parameterized by varying choice of α
and µ which are randomly sampled to ensure that a bursty use of a single word under certain topic is possible in our
experiment.Therefore our setting covers a wide range of hyper-parameters and captures some common irregularities
in distributional properties. Our synthetic setting allows for direct calculation of error on parameter recovery, which
is not feasible in real data. We compare the empirical loss of each configuration in different settings. In addition, we
compare all configurations of our spectral algorithm against differentially private variational inference [17] under the
same settings. Our algorithm universally outperforms the state-of-the-art VI quantitatively.
Evaluation Metric: Our experiments evaluate the loss between the ground-truth µ and the estimated µ̂ via a (ǫ, δ)
differentially private algorithm across varying privacy parameters (composite ǫ). For each edge set and a given com-
posite ǫ, we perform a grid search over the privacy parameters for each edge in the set to select the optimal combination.
When working with real data (e.g., Wikipedia), a maximum likelihood criterion could be used to select this optimal
configuration. We release only differentially private likelihoods by perturbing sufficient statistics, as described in [17].
See Appendix J for a more detailed explanation of this process.
VI vs Spectral: Figure 2 exhibits error for varying composite ǫ on different datasets. Under every configuration, our
differentially private spectral algorithm universally outperforms differentially private variational inference, and has
higher utility under the same level of privacy.
Small ǫ vs Large ǫ: From figure 2a, config 2 performs better for low ǫ, while Config. 1 performs better for larger ǫ.
Config. 3 and 4 perform universally worse than the other Configs as the number of topics is small.
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Figure 4: Perplexity scores of our method under all configurations vs the differentially private VI on Wikipedia
data.
Small α0 vs Large α0: In Figure 2c, config 1 performs the best. This is consistent with theoretical findings, as α0
is large andN exceeds d2. Config. 2 performs on par or worse than config. 1; this is partially due to Mˆ2 having small
singular values for this dataset, driving up the amount of noise added.
Small Corpus vs Large Corpus: Figure 2b, considers the limited data setting, N = 1000. Config 2 emerges as
better when α0 is large.
Mˆ2’s singular values vs α0: The singular values of Mˆ2 are positively correlated with the α0 parameter. Figure 3a
shows this correlation for large N . Consequently, we observe in figure 2c, for N = 100k and α0 = 1000, config. 2
has lower error. Low α0 yields documents polarized to single topics, while as α0 → ∞, the topics mix. This yields
increased variation among the singular values of Mˆ2, which drives down config 2’s sensitivity.
Singular value gap vs number of topics: The theoretical results posit that config 3 would likely be the best per-
forming, but this isn’t the case. This is likely due to the small singular value gap of γs. However, as we increase k
shown in Figure 3b, the gap increases (Figure 3b), which lowers the sensitivity along config. 3, leading to lower noise
addition.
7.1 Wikipedia Dataset
We verified good performance of our method on the wikipedia dataset. Preprocessing was minimal - removing all
non-alphanumeric characters and lower-casing. We experienced results of differing quality as we changed ǫ.
As shown in Figure 4 where the quantitative results (perplexity scores) onWikipedia are compared with variational
inference, our method suffers from less utility loss under the same privacy levels. As we observe in the Wiki results in
Figure 4, performance of config.3 is improved under larger number of topics k, confirming our theory.
8 Conclusion
We have provided an end-to-end analysis of differentially private LDAmodel using a spectral algorithm. The algorithm
involves a dataflow that permits different locations for injecting noise. We present a detailed sensitivity and utility
analysis for different differentially private configurations.
We show that no configuration dominates and recommend configurations for different scenarios. Config 1 is
preferable when N ≫ k, or when the topics are highly polarized in documents (different documents do not have
many topics in common). Config 2 is preferable when N is small, and the topics are mixed in the dataset. Config 3
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is preferable when k is large. Additionally, we identified an interesting correlation between the singular values of M2
and α0, specifically that increasing the mixture of the topics in the documents leads to higher singular values.
The analysis that was used can be extended to other latent variable models where the parameters are estimated
using similar spectral methods such as Gaussian mixtures and Hidden Markov Models [3].
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Appendix: An end-to-end Differentially Private Latent Dirichlet Allocation
Using a Spectral Algorithm
A B. Differential Privacy Review
Definition 17 (Utility Loss & Error). Let f : D → Y be a random algorithm and fDP(X) be the differentially
private version of f. For some value x ∈ D, let y ∈ Y be the ground truth value. Then define ∥∥f(x)− fDP(X)∥∥
F
as
the utility loss for this input. Additionally, define
∥∥y − fDP(X)∥∥
F
as the error for this input.
The gaussian mechanism proposed in [8] makes a random algorithm differentially private by adding specifically
designed Gaussian noise to the output.
Proposition 18. [Gaussian mechanism] Let f : D → Y (Y ⊂ Rk) be a random algorithm with ℓ2 sensitivity ∆f .
Let g ∈ Rk and each coordinate gi be sampled i.i.d. from N (0,∆2f,ǫ,δ), where ∆f,ǫ,δ = ∆f τǫ,δ =
∆f
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)
ǫ .
Then the output fDP = f + g is (ǫ, δ) differentially private if 0 < ǫ ≤ 1.
The above bound is used for theoretical purposes only, a tighter and more general calibration of the Gaussian
mechanism that does not require ǫ ≤ 1 was proposed in [4].
Composition theorem [11] provides insights on how the differential privacy is preserved under algorithm compo-
sition.
Proposition 19. [Composition theorem] Let fDP1 (X), . . . , f
DP
n (X) be n differentially private algorithms with pri-
vacy parameters (ǫ1, δ1), . . . , (ǫn, δn). Then g
DP(X) = f(fDP1 (X), . . . , f
DP
n (X)) is (ǫ1 + . . . + ǫn, δ1 + . . . + δn)
differentially private.
This is what we called a simple composition where epsilon increases linearly. There is an advanced composition
where privacy loss for accessing for k times obey that
√
k.
B C. Latent Dirichlet Allocation
LDA, despite being a bag of words model, allows modeling of the mixed topics in a document to account for the more
general case in which a document belongs to several different latent classes (topics) simultaneously. Latent Dirichlet
Allocations has two major model parameters: topic prior α and topic-word matrix µ. Topic prior α determines the
topic proportions and the topic word matrix controls the word distribution per topic.
Topic Proportions The proportion of words in topics, known as topic proportion (denoted as θn for document n),
is drawn from a Dirichlet distribution (topic prior) parameterized by α = (α1, . . . , αk), with density Pα(θ = θn) =
Γ(α0)
k∏
i=1
Γ(αi)
k∏
i=1
θαk−1n,i , where α0 =
k∑
i=1
αi.
Topic-Word Matrix Under a topic i, tokens in the documents are assumed to be generated in a conditionally inde-
pendent manner through µi, i.e., token x1 ∼ Cat(d, µi) where Cat(d, µi) denotes the categorical distribution. Under
different topics, these conditional distributions µi are linearly independent, ∀i ∈ [k].
With the definition of the two major parameters, we now describe the generative model of LDA topic model. The
process involves generating topics first, followed by tokens.
Topic Generation LDA remains simple as each token in the corpus belongs to one of the k topics only, although
tokens in the same document could belong to different topics. We denote the topic of token j in document n as zn,j .
Therefore, topics generated are categorical zn,j ∈ [k] and distributed according to θn, i.e., zn,j ∼ Cat(k, θn) where
Cat(k, θn) denotes the categorical distribution.
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Word Generation Let x denote the tokens. After determining the topic of the token j, zn,j , token j is generated
conditionally independently through µzn,j , i.e., token ∼ Cat(d, µzn,j ). In a document n, if the j′th token xn,j′ is the
v-th word in the dictionary, then xn,j′ = ev where ev is a one-hot encoding, i.e., xn,j′ (j) = 0 ∀j 6= v and xn,j′(j) = 1
if j = v. Let ln be the length of document n, random realizations of token x, i.e., {xn,j′}lnj′=1, are i.i.d.
Term-Document Matrix The term-document matrix D ∈ Nd×N0 . The nth column in D is denoted by cn, where
its jth component cn(j) = number of times word j in the vocabulary appeared in document n. This means that
cn =
∑ln
j′=1 xn,j′ where ln is the number of words in document n. Clearly, ln =
∑d
j cn(j) = ‖cn‖1.
C D. Method of Moments for Latent Dirichlet Allocation
Empirical Moment Estimators The moments that we obtain are not the population moments but rather empirically
estimated moments from the given data set. We list the forms of first, second, and third order empirical moment
estimators for the single topic case as shown in [27]. Given a document n, the following quantities are calculated.
˜˜Mn1 =
cn
ln
(2)
˜˜Mn2 =
1
2
(
ln
2
) (cn ⊗ cn − diag(cn)) (3)
˜˜Mn3 =
1
6
(
ln
3
)(cn ⊗ cn ⊗ cn + 2 d∑
i=1
cn(i)(ei ⊗ ei ⊗ ei)
−
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
cn(i)cn(j)(ei ⊗ ei ⊗ ej + ei ⊗ ej ⊗ ej + ej ⊗ ei ⊗ ej)
)
(4)
The empirically estimated moments are the averages of these quantities over the entire data set. Specifically,
Lemma 20. Single Topic Empirical Moment Estimators(Propositions 3 and 4 in [27])
Eˆ[x1] =
1
N
N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
Eˆ[x1 ⊗ x2] = 1
N
N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn2
Eˆ[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ x3] = 1
N
N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn3
Further these moments are unbiased, i.e.:
E[Eˆ[x1]] = E[
1
N
N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1 ] = E[x1]
E[Eˆ[x1 ⊗ x2]] = E[ 1
N
N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn2 ] = E[x1 ⊗ x2]
E[Eˆ[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ x3]] = E[ 1
N
N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn3 ] = E[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ x3]
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Note that this lemma implies that: E[ ˜˜Mn1 ] = E[x1],E[
˜˜Mn2 ] = E[x1 ⊗ x2], and that E[ ˜˜Mn3 ] = E[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ x3] for
any sampled document n.
We extend the single topic moment estimators of [27] to the LDA case.
Lemma 21. Empirical Moment estimators for LDA
Mˆ1 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
˜˜
M
n
1 (5)
Mˆ2 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
˜˜
M
n
2
]
−
a
2
(
N
2
)[ N∑
m,n=1
˜˜
M
n
1 ⊗
˜˜
M
m
1 −
N∑
n=1
˜˜
M
n
1 ⊗
˜˜
M
n
1
]
(6)
Mˆ3 = d
[
1
N
N∑
n=1
˜˜
M
n
3 +B1 +B2 +B3 + b
]
(7)
where
B1
def
=
b
2
(
N
2
)[( N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn2
)
⊗
( N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)]
, (8)
b
def
= c
[( N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)
⊗
( N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)
⊗
( N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)]
, (9)
B2 andB3 are formed fromB1 by permuting, i.e., [B2]ijk = [B1]ikj and [B3]ijk = [B1]kij . Further, a =
α0
α0+1
, b =
−α0
α0+2
, c =
2α20
(α0+1)(α0+2)
, and d = α0(α0+1)(α0+2)2 .
Now we prove that these estimators are unbiased.
Lemma 22 (The LDA Moment Estimators are Unbiased). The estimators defined in definition 21 are unbiased, i.e.,
E[Mˆ1] = M1 (10)
E[Mˆ2] = M2 (11)
E[Mˆ3] = M3 (12)
Proof. First order moment:
E[Mˆ1] = E[
1
N
N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1 ] =
1
N
N∑
n=1
E[ ˜˜Mn1 ] =
1
N
N∑
n=1
E[
cn
ln
]
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
1
ln
E[cn] =
1
N
N∑
n=1
1
ln
E[
ln∑
i=1
xn,i] =
1
N
N∑
n=1
1
ln
ln∑
i=1
E[xn,i]
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
1
ln
ln∑
i=1
E[x1] =
1
N
N∑
n=1
1
ln
lnE[x1] =
1
N
NE[x1] = E[x1] = M1
Second order moment: The first term of Mˆ2 is actually the estimator the single-topic second order moment and
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E[ 1N
∑N
n=1
˜˜Mn2 ]] = E[x1 ⊗ x2] see proposition 3 in [27] and its appendix for the proof. Now we have:
E
[
a
2
(
N
2
)[ N∑
m,n=1
˜˜Mn1 ⊗ ˜˜Mm1 −
N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1 ⊗ ˜˜Mn1
]]
=E
[
a
2
(
N
2
)[ N∑
m=1
n=1
m 6=n
˜˜Mn1 ⊗ ˜˜Mm1 +
N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1 ⊗ ˜˜Mn1 −
N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1 ⊗ ˜˜Mn1
]]
=E
[
a
2
(
N
2
) N∑
m=1
n=1
m 6=n
˜˜Mn1 ⊗ ˜˜Mm1
]
=
a
2
(
N
2
) N∑
m=1
n=1
m 6=n
E[ ˜˜Mn1 ]⊗ E[ ˜˜Mn1 ]
=
a
2
(
N
2
) N∑
m=1
n=1
m 6=n
E[x1]⊗ E[x1]
=
a
N(N − 1)N(N − 1)E[x1]⊗ E[x1]
=a2E[x1]⊗ E[x1]
Thus, we have that:
E[Mˆ2] = E[x1 ⊗ x2]− α0
α0 + 2
E[x1]⊗ E[x1] = M2
Third order moment: Similar to the second order moment, the first term of Mˆ3 is the estimator the single-topic
second order moment and E[ 1N
∑N
n=1
˜˜Mn3 ]] = E[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ x3] as shown in proposition 4 in [27] and proved in
its appendix. We need to prove that (1): E[B1] = bE[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ E[x3]], note that E[x3] = M1 and (2): E[b] =
cE[x1]⊗E[x1]⊗E[x1] = cM1⊗M1⊗M1⊗M1. SinceB2 andB3 are permuted version ofB1 their proofs follow
from the proof ofB1.
For B1 we simplify the expression and then show that the expectation of the resultant is equal to the desired
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moment:
E[B1] =
b
2
(
N
2
)E[( N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn2
)
⊗
( N∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)
−
N∑
n=1
(
˜˜Mn2 ⊗ ˜˜Mn1
)]
=
b
2
(
N
2
)E[ N∑
m=1,n=1
m 6=n
(
˜˜Mn2 ⊗ ˜˜Mm1
)
+
N∑
n=1
(
˜˜Mn2 ⊗ ˜˜Mn1
)
−
N∑
n=1
(
˜˜Mn2 ⊗ ˜˜Mn1
)]
=
b
2
(
N
2
)E[ N∑
m=1,n=1
m 6=n
(
˜˜Mn2 ⊗ ˜˜Mm1
)]
=
b
2
(
N
2
) N∑
m=1,n=1
m 6=n
E
[
˜˜Mn2
]
⊗ E
[
˜˜Mm1
]
=
b
2
(
N
2
) N∑
m=1,n=1
m 6=n
E[x1 ⊗ x2]⊗ E[x3]
=
b
N(N − 1)N(N − 1)E[x1 ⊗ x2]⊗ E[x3]
=bE[x1 ⊗ x2]⊗ E[x3]
=bE
[
x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ E[x3]
]
For b identity 30 is applied, this leads to the following
E[b] =
c
6
(
N
3
)E[( N∑
i=1
( ˜˜Mn1 )
⊗3 + 3
N,N∑
n=1,m=1
n6=m
( ˜˜Mn1 )
⊗2 ˜˜Mm1 +
N,N,N∑
n=1,m=1,p=1
n6=m,m 6=p,p6=n
˜˜Mn1 ⊗ ˜˜Mm1 ⊗ ˜˜Mp1
− 3
N∑
m=1
( N∑
n=1
(
˜˜Mn1
)⊗2
⊗
(
˜˜Mm1
))
+ 2
N∑
n=1
(
˜˜Mn1
)⊗3)]
=
c
6
(
N
3
)E[ N,N,N∑
n=1,m=1,p=1
n6=m,m 6=p,p6=n
˜˜Mn1 ⊗ ˜˜Mm1 ⊗ ˜˜Mp1
]
=
c
N(N − 1)(N − 2)(N)(N − 1)(N − 2)E[
˜˜Mn1 ]⊗ E[ ˜˜Mm1 ]⊗ E[ ˜˜Mp1 ]
=cE[x1]⊗ E[x1]⊗ E[x1]
Combing these results and plugging the values for a, b,and c we get:
E[Mˆ3] =E[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ x3]− α0
α0 + 2
(
E[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ E[x3]] + E[x1 ⊗ E[x2]⊗ x3] + E[E[x1]⊗ x2 ⊗ x3]
)
+
2α20
(α0 + 1)(α0 + 2)
E[x1]⊗ E[x1]⊗ E[x1] = M3
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D E. Lemmas regarding Dirichlet Moments
This section introduces two lemmas regarding the moments of the dirichlet distribution that will be useful for the proof
of 3.
D.1 Dirichlet Moments
Lemma 23. The first, second and third moments of dirichlet distribution are
E[θ] =
1
α0
α (13)
E[θ ⊗ θ] = 1
α0(α0 + 1)
[α⊗ α+
T∑
t=1
αtet ⊗ et] (14)
E[θ ⊗ θ ⊗ θ] = 1
α0(α0 + 1)(α0 + 2)
[α⊗ α⊗ α+
T∑
t=1
αtet ⊗ et ⊗ α
+
T∑
t=1
αtα⊗ et ⊗ et +
T∑
t=1
αtet ⊗ α⊗ et + 2
T∑
t=1
αtet ⊗ et ⊗ et] (15)
D.2 Raw Moments
Lemma 24.
E[x1] = µE[θ] (16)
E[x1 ⊗ x2] = µE[θ ⊗ θ]µ⊤ (17)
E[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ x3] = E[θ ⊗ θ ⊗ θ](µ, µ, µ) (18)
Proof. First Order Moments Let us omit n and use x1 to denote a token in any document, and we will use x2 and x3
to denote other two tokens in the same document. The the expectation of a token is
E[x1] = E[x2] = E[x3] = E[E[x1|θ]] = µE[θ] (19)
This is called the first order moment.
Second Order Moments The second order moment is defined as
E[x1 ⊗ x2] = E[E[x1 ⊗ x2|θ]] (20)
=
∑
i,i′
E[x1 ⊗ x2|zn,j = ei, zn,k = ei′ ]P (zn,j = ei, zn,k = ei′) (21)
=
∑
i,i′
E[x1|zn,j = ei]⊗ E[x2|zn,k = ei′ ]P (zn,j = ei, zn,k = ei′) (22)
=
∑
i,i′
µei ⊗ (µei′)P (zn,j = ei, zn,k = ei′) (23)
= µ
∑
i,i′
ei ⊗ ei′P (zn,j = ei, zn,k = ei′)µ⊤ (24)
= µE[θ ⊗ θ]µ⊤ (25)
Third Order Moments The third order moment is defined as
E[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ x3] = E[E[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ x3|θ]] = E[θ ⊗ θ ⊗ θ](µ, µ, µ) (26)
To clarify the notations, x ⊗ y is a length(x)-by-length(y) matrix which has entries [x ⊗ y]i,j = xiyj . And E[θ ⊗
θ ⊗ θ](µ, µ, µ) is a tucker with core tensor E[θ ⊗ θ ⊗ θ] and projection µ in all three modes.
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E F. Proof of Lemma 3
The lemma relates the LDA moments to the model parameters α and µ.
Proof. In order to prove this relation, we combine Lemmas 23 and Lemma 24 to prove the forms ofM1,M2 andM3
in Lemma 3 as follows.
M1 = E[x1] = µE[θ] (27)
=
k∑
i=1
αi
α0
µi (28)
M2 = E[x1 ⊗ x2]− α0
α0 + 1
E[x1]⊗ E[x1] (29)
= E[θ ⊗ θ](µ, µ)− 1
α0(α0 + 1)
M1 ⊗M1 (30)
=
k∑
i=1
αi
α0(α0 + 1)
µi ⊗ µi (31)
M3 = E[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ x3]− 1
α0 + 2
(E[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ E[x3]] + E[x1 ⊗ E[x2]⊗ x3]
+ E[E[x1]⊗ x2 ⊗ x3]) + 2
α0(α0 + 1)(α0 + 2)
E[x1]⊗ E[x1]⊗ E[x1] (32)
= E[θ ⊗ θ ⊗ θ](µ, µ, µ) (33)
− 1
α0 + 2
{E[θ ⊗ θ ⊗ E[θ]]− E[θ ⊗ E[θ] ⊗ θ]− E[E[θ] ⊗ θ ⊗ θ]}(µ, µ, µ) (34)
+
2
α0(α0 + 1)(α0 + 2)
M1 ⊗M1 ⊗M1 (35)
=
k∑
i
2αi
α0(α0 + 1)(α0 + 2)
µi ⊗ µi ⊗ µi (36)
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F G. Computing E[x1],E[x1 ⊗ x2],E[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ x3]
Let cn be the count vector.
E[x1] =
1
N
N∑
n=1
1
ln
cn (37)
E[x1 ⊗ x2] = 1
N
N∑
n=1
1
2
(
ln
2
) [cn ⊗ cn − diag(cn)] (38)
E[x1 ⊗ x2 ⊗ x3] = 1
N
N∑
n=1
1
6
(
ln
3
) [cn ⊗ cn ⊗ cn
−
D∑
i,j=1
cn(i)cn(j)ei ⊗ ei ⊗ ej −
D∑
i,j=1
cn(i)cn(j)ei ⊗ ej ⊗ ei
−
D∑
i,j=1
cn(i)cn(j)ej ⊗ ei ⊗ ei
+2
D∑
i,j=1
cn(i)ei ⊗ ei ⊗ ei
 (39)
G H. Dirichlet Moments
We characterize the core tensorE[θ⊗θ⊗θ], where i, j, k-th entry of the tensor is E[θiθjθk]. Now the moments of topic
models are reduced to moments of topic proportions. Since topic proportions are dirichlet distributed, we characterize
the dirichlet moments.
univariate moments for i-th coordinate of dirichlet variable θi We know that E[θ
p
i ] =
Γ(αi+p)
Γ(αi)
Γ(α0)
Γ(α0+p)
, therefore
E[θi] =
αi
α0
(40)
E[θ2i ] =
αi(αi + 1)
α0(α0 + 1)
(41)
E[θ3i ] =
αi(αi + 1)(αi + 2)
α0(α0 + 1)(α0 + 2)
(42)
bivariate moments We know that E[θpi θ
q
j ] =
Γ(αi+p)
Γ(αi)
Γ(αj+q)
Γ(αj)
Γ(α0)
Γ(α0+p+q)
, therefore
E[θiθj ] =
αiαj
α0(α0 + 1)
(43)
E[θ2i θj ] =
αi(αi + 1)αj
α0(α0 + 1)(α0 + 2)
(44)
trivariate moments We know that E[θiθjθk] =
Γ(αi+1)
Γ(αi)
Γ(αj+1)
Γ(αj)
Γ(αk+1)
Γ(αk)
Γ(α0)
Γ(α0+3)
, therefore
E[θiθjθk] =
αiαjαk
α0(α0 + 1)(α0 + 2)
(45)
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Config.
(Edge Set) Sensitivity Utility Loss (
∥∥µi − µDPi ∥∥)
1: M̂3, Ŵ , Ŵ
† O( 1N ) O(
√
σ1(Mˆ2)k
γs
((
√
d
Nσk(Mˆ2)1.5
τǫ4,δ4)
3+
(e3, e4, e8)
√
d
Nσk(Mˆ2)1.5
τǫ3,δ3) +
√
σ1(Mˆ2)d
σk(Mˆ2)N
τǫ8,δ8+√
σ1(Mˆ2) +
√
d
N τǫ8,δ8
√
k
γs[
(
√
d
Nσk(Mˆ2)
τǫ4,δ4)
3 +
√
d
Nσk(Mˆ2)1.5
τǫ3,δ3
]
)
2: T̂ , Ŵ † O( k1.5
N(σk(Mˆ2))1.5
) O(
√
σ1(Mˆ2)k2.5
γsNσk(Mˆ2)1.5
τǫ6,δ6 +
√
σ1(Mˆ2)d
σk(Mˆ2)N
τǫ8,δ8
(e6, e8) +
√
σ1(Mˆ2) +
√
d
N τǫ8,δ8
k2.5τǫ6,δ6
γsNσ1(Mˆ2)1.5
)
3: µ¯,Ŵ
† O( k
2
γsN(σk(Mˆ2))1.5
) O(
√
σ1(Mˆ2)k2.5
γsNσk(Mˆ2)1.5
τǫ7,δ7 +
√
σ1(Mˆ2)d
σk(Mˆ2)N
τǫ8,δ8
(e7, e8) +
√
σ1(Mˆ2) +
√
d
N τǫ8,δ8
k2τǫ7,δ7
γsNσ1(Mˆ2)1.5
)
4: µ̂ (e9) O(
k2
√
σ1(Mˆ2)
γsN(σk(Mˆ2))
1.5 ) O(
√
σ1(Mˆ2)dk
2
γsNσk(Mˆ2)1.5
τǫ9,δ9)
Table 1: Utility of different configurations that guarantee differentially private LDA. The table lists edges in Figure 1
on which to add Gaussian noise in order to achieve differentially private topic model using method of moments. We
use τ as defined in Proposition 18 to decompose the dependence of the noise variance on both the sensitivity and the
privacy parameters ǫ, δ, i.e. σ = ∆τǫi,i,δi,i , where∆ is the sensitivity.
Therefore we obtain
E[θ] =
1
α0
α (46)
E[θ ⊗ θ] = 1
α0(α0 + 1)
[α⊗ α+
T∑
t=1
αtet ⊗ et] (47)
E[θ ⊗ θ ⊗ θ] = 1
α0(α0 + 1)(α0 + 2)
[α⊗ α⊗ α+
T∑
t=1
αtet ⊗ et ⊗ α
+
T∑
t=1
αtα⊗ et ⊗ et +
T∑
t=1
αtet ⊗ α⊗ et + 2
T∑
t=1
αtet ⊗ et ⊗ et] (48)
Lemma 25 (Correctness of Method ofMoments in Learning LDA [1]). Applying the method of moments over a corpus
ofN documents sampled iid. There exist universal constantsC1, C2 ≥ 0 such that ifN > C1((α0 +1)/p2minσk(µ)2),
then ‖µi − µˆi‖2 ≤ C2 (α0+1)
2k3
p2
min
σk(µ)
√
N
, where pmin = mini
αi
α0
, µ is a matrix of stacked word-topic vectors, i.e. µ =
[µ1| . . . |µk].
H I. Sensitivity Proofs
In proving the sensitivities for Mˆ2 and Mˆ3 we rely on the fact that frequently in the calculations, we encounter
probability vectors, matrices, and tensors where the elements sum to 1. This is identical to the stating that the l1 norm
equals 1. Further, we note the following Lemma which essentially states that taking the outer product of a vector with
a probability vector or probability matrix does not increase the lq norm of the vector and in fact keeps it the same if
q = 1.
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Lemma 26 (Multiplying by probabilities does not change the norm). Let vp,Mp be a probability vector, matrix,
respectively and let v, u be ordinary vectors, matrices, respectively. Then the following holds:∥∥uvTp ∥∥q ≤ ‖u‖q , which is equal if q = 1. (49)
If T = Mp ⊗ u, then ‖T ‖q = ‖Mp ⊗ u‖q ≤ ‖u‖q , which is equal if q = 1. (50)
Proof. ∥∥uvTp ∥∥q = (∑
i,j
|uivpj |q)1/q = (
∑
i
|ui|q
∑
j
|vpj |q)1/q = ‖v‖q ‖u‖q ≤ ‖u‖q . (51)
Where we used the fact that ‖x‖1 ≥ ‖x‖q for any q ≥ 1 and that ‖vp‖1 = 1. Thus the above inequality is tight if
q = 1.
‖T ‖q = ‖Mp ⊗ u‖q =
(∑
i,j,k
|Mpi,juk|q
)1/q
=
(∑
k
|uk|q
∑
i,j
|Mpi,j |q
)1/q
= ‖u‖q ‖Mp‖q ≤ ‖u‖q . (52)
Where we used the fact that for any matrixM , ‖M‖1 ≥ ‖M‖q for any q ≥ 1 ∗ and that ‖Mp‖1 = 1. Thus the above
inequality is tight if q = 1.
Proposition 27.
• ˜˜Mn1 is a probability vector.
• ˜˜Mn2 is a probability matrix.
• ˜˜Mn3 is a probability tensor.
Proof. The proof is immediate as these moments correspond to join probability estimates [27], specifically:
˜˜Mn1 (i) = P[x1 = i]
˜˜Mn1 (i, j) = P[x1 = i, x2 = j]
˜˜Mn1 (i, j, k) = P[x1 = i, x2 = j, x3 = k]
H.1 Proof for Theorem 4 (sensitivity for Mˆ2)
Let∆2 be the l1 sensitivity for Mˆ2, then∆2 is
2
N +
α0
α0+1
4
N =O(
1
N ).
Proof. Let Mˆ2 and Mˆ ′2 be two second order LDA moments generated from two neighboring corpora, WLOG assume
the difference is in the nth record, i.e. D = [c1| . . . |cN−1|cN ] andD′ = [c1| . . . |cN−1|c′N ] then:
Mˆ2 − Mˆ ′2 = 1
N
( ˜˜MN2 − ˜˜MN2
′
)− a
2
(
N
2
) ([ ˜˜MN1 ⊗ (N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)
+
(N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)
⊗ ˜˜MN1
]
−
[
˜˜MN1
′
⊗
(N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)
+
(N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)
⊗ ˜˜MN1
′])
=
1
N
( ˜˜MN2 − ˜˜MN2
′
)− a
2
(
N
2
) (( ˜˜MN1 − ˜˜MN1 ′)⊗ (N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)
+
(N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)
⊗ ( ˜˜MN1 − ˜˜MN1
′
)
)
=
1
N
( ˜˜MN2 − ˜˜MN2
′
)− a
N
(
( ˜˜MN1 − ˜˜MN1
′
)⊗
(
1
N − 1
N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)
+
(
1
N − 1
N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)
⊗ ( ˜˜MN1 − ˜˜MN1
′
)
)
∗These norms are obtained by extending the vector definition to matrices or simply vectorizing the matrix and then calculating the norm.
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Note that according to proposition (27)
˜˜MN1 and
˜˜MN1
′
are probability vectors and
˜˜MN2 and
˜˜MN2
′
are probability ma-
trices. Further,
(
1
N−1
∑N−1
n=1
˜˜Mn2
)
is also a probability matrix since it’s the normalized sum of probability matrices.
We upper bound the l1 norm of the expression by applying the triangular inequality and using lemma (26) for the terms
involving a tensor product. This leads to the following:∥∥∥Mˆ2 − Mˆ ′2∥∥∥
1
≤ 2
N
+
4a
N
=
2
N
+
α0
α0 + 1
4
N
= O(
1
N
)
a was replaced by its expression as in the above a = α0α0+1 in the above.
H.2 Proof for Theorem 4 (sensitivity for Mˆ3)
Let∆3 be the l1 sensitivity for Mˆ3, then∆3 is
2
N +
4α0
α0+2
1
N +
12α20
(α0+1)(α0+2)
(N−1)
N(N−2) = O(
1
N ).
Proof. Following a similar setting as in H.1 we have the two moments Mˆ3 and Mˆ
′
3 generated from two neighboring
corpora. First we note that the expression of Mˆ3 and Mˆ ′3 have the following form: 1N
∑N
n=1
˜˜Mn3 +B1+B2+B3+b.
Effectively there are three kinds of terms: (a) 1N
∑N
n=1
˜˜M , (b) B1, and (c)b. Since B2 and B3are permuted versions
ofB1 they have a similar behavior
(a) 1N
∑N
n=1
˜˜M : The first term difference between Mˆ3 and Mˆ ′3 would result in 1N (
˜˜MN3 − ˜˜MN3
′
).
1
N
∥∥∥∥ ˜˜MN3 − ˜˜MN3 ′∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 1
N
(∥∥∥ ˜˜MN3 ∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥∥∥ ˜˜MN3 ′∥∥∥∥
1
)
≤ 2
N
Note that both
˜˜MN3 and
˜˜MN3
′
are probability tensors.
(b)B1: Based on the minimized expression, theB1 term difference between Mˆ3 and Mˆ
′
3 is equal to:
B1 −B′1 = b
2
(
N
2
)[ ˜˜MN2 ⊗ (N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)
+
(N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn2
)
⊗ ˜˜MN1
− ˜˜MN2
′
⊗
(N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)
−
(N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn2
)
⊗ ˜˜MN1
′
]
=
b
N
[(
˜˜MN2 − ˜˜MN2
′)
⊗
( 1
N − 1
N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1
)
+
( 1
N − 1
N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn2
)
⊗
(
˜˜MN1 − ˜˜MN2
)′]
Note that 1N−1
N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn1 and
1
N−1
N−1∑
n=1
˜˜Mn2 are probability vectors and matrices, respectively. Thus lemma 26 can be
used to upper bound the l1 norm, leading to the following:
‖B1 −B′1‖1 ≤
|b|
N
(
2 + 2
)
=
4|b|
N
=
4α0
α0 + 2
1
N
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(c) b: Based on the minimized expression, the b term difference between Mˆ3 and Mˆ
′
3 is equal to:
b− b′ = c
6
(
N
3
)[( ˜˜MN1 ⊗ ( N−1∑
m=1,p=1
distinct
˜˜Mm1 ⊗ ˜˜Mp1
)
+
( N−1∑
n=1,p=1
distinct
˜˜Mn1 ⊗ ˜˜MN1 ⊗ ˜˜Mp1
)
+
( N−1∑
n=1,m=1
distinct
˜˜Mn1 ⊗ ˜˜Mm1
)⊗ ˜˜MN1
)
−
(
˜˜MN1
′
⊗ ( N−1∑
m=1,p=1
distinct
˜˜Mm1 ⊗ ˜˜Mp1
)
− ( N−1∑
n=1,p=1
distinct
˜˜Mn1 ⊗ ˜˜MN1
′
⊗ ˜˜Mp1
)− ( N−1∑
n=1,m=1
distinct
˜˜Mn1 ⊗ ˜˜Mm1
)⊗ ˜˜MN1
)]
=
c(N − 1)
N(N − 2)
[( ˜˜MN1 − ˜˜MN1 ′)⊗ ( 1(N − 1)2
N−1∑
m=1,p=1
distinct
˜˜Mm1 ⊗ ˜˜Mp1
)
+
( 1
(N − 1)2
N−1∑
n=1,p=1
distinct
˜˜Mn1 ⊗
( ˜˜MN1 − ˜˜MN1 ′)⊗ ˜˜Mp1 )
+
( 1
(N − 1)2
N−1∑
n=1,m=1
distinct
˜˜Mn1 ⊗ ˜˜Mm1
)⊗ ( ˜˜MN1 − ˜˜MN1 ′)
]
Similarly, we have probability tensors so we use lemma 26 to bound the l1 norm. This results in:
‖b− b′‖1 ≤
c(N − 1)
N(N − 2)(2 + 2 + 2) =
6c(N − 1)
N(N − 2) =
12α20
(α0 + 1)(α0 + 2)
(N − 1)
N(N − 2)
Combing the results from (a), (b) and (c), we have the following bound:
∆3 ≤ 2
N
+
4α0
α0 + 2
1
N
+
12α20
(α0 + 1)(α0 + 2)
(N − 1)
N(N − 2) = O(
1
N
)
H.3 Proof for Theorem 5 (sensitivity for Mˆ3(Wˆ , Wˆ , Wˆ ) )
As explained before, the whitened tensor is denoted as T̂ for simplicity. Therefore we denote the sensitivity of
Mˆ3(Wˆ , Wˆ , Wˆ ) as∆T̂ . Theorem 5 states that ∆T̂ = O(
k3/2
Nσk(Mˆ2)3/2
).
We need the following Lemma to prove Theorem 5.
Lemma 28.
∥∥∥Wˆ ′ − Wˆ∥∥∥
F
≤
√
2k∆2
σk(Mˆ2)
√
1
2 (σk(Mˆ2)+σk+1(Mˆ2))
Proof. We follow an analysis similar to [1]. Note that the whitening matrix Wˆ is defined such that:
WˆT Mˆ2,kWˆ = I.
Analogously for the neighboring corpus,
Wˆ ′
T
Mˆ ′2,kWˆ ′ = I.
Let EM2 denote the perturbation introduced to Mˆ2 by changing a single record.
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Because the spectral gap of the perturbation introduced by modifying a single record is small according to the
condition, applying the original whitening matrix to the neighboring data base moment Mˆ ′2 would lead to a rank k
matrix of size k × k.
Therefore, WˆT Mˆ ′2,kWˆ is a rank k matrix of size k × k, which can be factorized as:
WˆT Mˆ ′2,kWˆ = ADAT
where A are the singular vectors of WˆT Mˆ ′2,kWˆ , and D is a diagonal matrix of the corresponding singular values of
WˆT Mˆ ′2,kWˆ . This also leads to Wˆ ′ = WˆAD
−1
2 AT . Using this, we observe:∥∥∥Wˆ ′ − Wˆ∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥Wˆ ′ − Wˆ ′AD 12AT ∥∥∥ (53)
=
∥∥∥Wˆ ′(I −AD 12AT )∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥Wˆ ′∥∥∥ ∥∥∥I −AD 12AT ∥∥∥
(54)
Now we bound
∥∥∥I −AD 12AT ∥∥∥:∥∥∥I −AD 12AT∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥ATA− Wˆ ′AD 12AT ∥∥∥ (55)
=
∥∥∥I −D 12∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥(I −D 12 )(I +D 12 )∥∥∥
≤ ‖(I −D)‖
=
∥∥I −ADAT ∥∥
=
∥∥∥WˆT Mˆ2,kWˆ − Wˆ ′T Mˆ ′2,kWˆ ′∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥Wˆ∥∥∥2 ∥∥∥Mˆ2,k − Mˆ ′2,k∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥Wˆ∥∥∥2 ‖EM2‖ (56)
We know that ∥∥∥Wˆ∥∥∥2 ≤ 1
σk(Mˆ2)
(57)∥∥∥Wˆ ′∥∥∥ ≤ 1√
σk(Mˆ ′2)
≤ 1√
σk(Mˆ2)− ‖EM2‖2
≤ 1
σk(Mˆ2)
√
1
2 (σk(Mˆ2) + σk+1(Mˆ2))
(58)
Weyl’s theorem was used in the last bound in Equation (58). Bounding the Frobenius norm, would result in the
following:∥∥∥Wˆ ′ − Wˆ∥∥∥
F
≤
√
2k
∥∥∥Wˆ ′ − Wˆ∥∥∥ ≤ √2k ‖EM2‖
σk(Mˆ2)
√
σk(Mˆ2)− ‖EM2‖
≤
√
2k∆2
σk(Mˆ2)
√
1
2σk(Mˆ2) + σk+1(Mˆ2)
,
where we have used the fact that the l1 norm upper bounds the spectral norm of a matrix, since it upper bounds the
Frobenius.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 5.
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Proof. Mˆ ′3 = Mˆ3 + E3.∥∥∥Mˆ3(Wˆ , Wˆ , Wˆ )− Mˆ ′3(Wˆ ′, Wˆ ′, Wˆ ′)∥∥∥
F
= ‖Mˆ3(Wˆ , Wˆ , Wˆ )− MˆLDA3 (Wˆ ′, Wˆ ′, Wˆ ′)
− E3(Wˆ ′, Wˆ ′, Wˆ ′)‖F (59)
≤
∥∥∥MˆLDA3 ( ˆW −W ′, ˆW −W ′, ˆW −W ′)∥∥∥
F
+
∥∥∥E3(Wˆ ′, Wˆ ′, Wˆ ′)∥∥∥
F
(60)
≤
∥∥∥Mˆ3∥∥∥
F
∥∥∥Wˆ − Wˆ ′∥∥∥3
F
+ ‖∆3‖F
∥∥∥Wˆ ′∥∥∥3
F
(61)
We have used the fact that the Frobenius norm of the difference between the tensors is bounded above by the l1
norm of the difference∆3. To bound the l1 norm of Mˆ3 we use an analysis similar to calculating∆3. Again we note
that the l1 norm upper bounds the Frobenius norm:∥∥∥Mˆ3∥∥∥
F
≤
∥∥∥Mˆ2∥∥∥
1
= 1 +
6α0
α0 + 2
N
N − 1 +
6α20
(α0 + 1)(α0 + 2)
N3
N(N − 1)(N − 2) (62)
Combining all the expressions we get:
∆T̂ =
∥∥∥Mˆ3(Wˆ , Wˆ , Wˆ )− Mˆ ′3(Wˆ ′, Wˆ ′, Wˆ ′)∥∥∥
F
(63)
≤ (1 + 6α0
α0 + 2
N
N − 1 +
6α20
(α0 + 1)(α0 + 2)
N3
N(N − 1)(N − 2))
× (2k)
3/2(∆2)
3
(σk(Mˆ2)
√
1
2 (σk(Mˆ2) + σk+1(Mˆ2)))
3
+
∆3k
3/2
(12 (σk(Mˆ2) + σk+1(Mˆ2)))
3/2
(64)
= O(
k3/2
Nσk(Mˆ2)3/2
) (65)
(66)
We see that if N is larger than d3/2, then Nσk(Mˆ2)
3/2 ≥ 1 as σi(Mˆ2) is in the order of 1/d.
H.4 Proof for Theorem 6 (sensitivity of the output of tensor decomposition µ¯i, α¯i )
Let µ¯1, . . . , µ¯k and α¯1, . . . , α¯k be the results of tensor decomposition before unwhitening. The sensitivity of µ¯i,
denoted as∆µ¯, and the sensitivity of α¯i, denoted as∆α¯, are both upper bounded by∆µ¯ ≤ O( k2γsN(σk(Mˆ2))3/2 ), where
γs = mini∈[k]
σi−σi+1
4 , σi is the i
th eigenvalue of Mˆ3(Wˆ , Wˆ , Wˆ ).
Proof. The proof follows from the result of the simultaneous tensor power method (Theorem 1 in [23]). Replacing the
original eigenvectors with those resulting from database D leads to tensor Mˆ3(Wˆ , Wˆ , Wˆ ), then the tensor resulting
from corpus D′ with one record changed yields Mˆ ′3(Wˆ ′, Wˆ ′, Wˆ ′) where the spectral norm of the error is upper
bounded by ǫ, if ∆T̂ is sufficiently small ∆T̂ ≤ γsǫ2√k . Therefore we get
∥∥µ¯i − µ¯′i∥∥2 ≤ 2√k∆T̂γs and |α¯i − α¯′i| ≤
2
√
k∆
T̂
γs
.
H.5 Proof for Theorem 7 (sensitivity of the final output µi, αi)
We now prove the sensitivity of the final output µi, αi: ∆µ = O(
k2
√
σ1(Mˆ2)
γsNσ
3/2
k (Mˆ2)
).
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Proof. We point out a number of things. Tensor decomposition outputs are: µ¯i, α¯i, i ∈ [k], where, α¯i = 2
√
(α0+1)α0
(α0+2)
√
αi
.
In order to recover the desired word topic vector µ, we have to “unwhiten” to get the µi and αi before whitening, i.e.
µi =
1√
αri
(WT )†µ¯i, where 1√
αri
= (α0+2)
2
√
(α0+1)α0
α¯i. The sensitivity would be:
max
D,D′
‖µi − µ′i‖ ≤ max
D,D′
{∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1√αri (WT )†µ¯i − 1√αr,′i (W
T,′)†µ¯′i
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
}
≤ max
D,D′
{
1√
αri
∥∥(WT )†∥∥ ‖µ¯i − µ¯′i‖+ 1√
αri
∥∥W † − (W ′)†∥∥+ ∥∥(W ′)†∥∥ | 1√
αri
− 1√
αri,′
|
}
We note the following:
1. maxD,D′ | 1√
αri
− 1√
αri,′
| = maxD,D′ | (α0+2)
2
√
(α0+1)α0
α¯i − (α0+2)
2
√
(α0+1)α0
α¯′i| ≤ (α0+2)2√(α0+1)α0 maxD,D′ |α¯i − α¯
′
i| ≤
(α0+2)
2
√
(α0+1)α0
2
√
k∆
T̂
γs
, where the above follows from the simultaneous power iteration method.
2. maxi∈[k] 1√αri ≤
(α0+2)
2
√
(α0+1)α0
maxi∈[k] α¯i =
(α0+2)
2
√
(α0+1)α0
σ1(T̂ )
3. max
∥∥((W ′)T )†∥∥ ≤√σ1(Mˆ ′2) ≤√σ1(Mˆ2) + ∆2
4. Following an analysis similar to that in 28, we obtain
∥∥W † − (W ′)†∥∥ ≤ √σ1(Mˆ2)
σk(Mˆ2)
∆2.
Combining all of this together leads to the following
max
D,D′
‖µi − µ′i‖ ≤ (α0 + 2)
2
√
(α0 + 1)α0
σ1(T̂ )
√
σ1(Mˆ2)
2
√
k∆T̂
γs
+
(α0 + 2)
2
√
(α0 + 1)α0
σ1(T̂ )
√
σ1(Mˆ2)
σk(Mˆ2)
∆2
+
(α0 + 2)
2
√
(α0 + 1)α0
√
σ1(Mˆ2) + ∆2
2
√
k∆T̂
γs
= O(
k2
√
σ1(Mˆ2)
γsNσ
3/2
k (Mˆ2)
)
H.6 Proof for Lemma 8
Proof. Let x, x′ be two adjacent data sets and the overall output be O := f(DATA) + Z(ǫ2, δ2, L˜S). Let S1 ⊂
Dom(O), S2 ⊂ Dom(LS) be any measurable sets.
Let E be the measurable set of L˜S that represents the event that L˜S ≥ LS.
p[(O, L˜S) ∈ S1 × S2|x]
=p[(O, L˜S) ∈ S1 × (S2 ∩ E)|x] + p[(O, L˜S) ∈ S1 × S2 ∩ Ec|x]
≤p[(O, L˜S) ∈ S1 × (S2 ∩ E)|x] + δ3
≤eǫ1+ǫ2p[(O, L˜S) ∈ S1 × (S2 ∩ E)|x′] + δ1 + δ2 + δ3
≤eǫ1+ǫ2p[(O, L˜S) ∈ S1 × S2|x′] + δ1 + δ2 + δ3
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The fourth line holds due to the fact that under event the E, L˜S is always a valid upper bound of the local sensitivity,
therefore, conditioning on the σ-field induced by E ∩ S2 for any S2, O is an (ǫ2, δ2)-DP release. By the simple
composition Theorem of (ǫ, δ)-DP [11][Theorem B.1,], by taking the measurable set of interest to be S1 × (S2 ∩ E),
we have that
p[(O, L˜S) ∈ S1 × (S2 ∩ E)|x] ≤ eǫ1+ǫ2p[(O, L˜S) ∈ S1 × (S2 ∩ E)|x′] + δ1 + δ2
which wraps up the proof.
H.7 Proof for Sensitivity of singular values σk(Mˆ2) (Lemma 9)
Proof. We first prove that the global sensitivity of σk(Mˆ2) is 1/n. By Weyl’s lemma [20][Theorem 1], for any matrix
X , any i, the singular value |σi(X) − σi(X + E)| ≤ ‖E‖2. In our case, E is coming from adding or removing one
data point and we know that ‖E‖2 ≤ ‖E‖F ≤ ‖E‖1,1 ≤ 2/n, hence the bound.
Nowwe prove that the global sensitivity of γs = mini∈[k]
σi(T̂ )−σi+1(T̂ )
4 . For any tensor T̂ , we consider a polyadic
form or the so called tensor decomposition form, and denote the singular values as the amplitude of the components
in the polyadic form. As shown in Section H.2, |σi(T̂ ) − σi(T̂ + E)| ≤ ‖E‖ ≤ 1, where E comes from adding or
removing one data point.
I J. Utility Proofs
Before starting the utility proofs, we point out a number of things. Tensor decomposition outputs:µ¯i, α¯i, i ∈ [k].
Where, α¯i =
2
√
(α0+1)α0
(α0+2)
√
αi
. In order to recover the desired word topic vector µ, we have to ’reverse whiten’, i.e.
µi =
1√
αri
(WT )†µ¯i, where 1√
αri
= (α0+2)
2
√
(α0+1)α0
α¯i. We need to establish the distance between the non-differentially
private output and the differentially private output, i.e.
∥∥µi − µDPi ∥∥. This can be upper bounded similar to H.5 by the
following: ∥∥µi − µDPi ∥∥ ≤ 1√
αri
∥∥(WT )†∥∥ ∥∥µ¯i − µ¯DPi ∥∥
+
1√
αri
∥∥W † − (WDP )†∥∥+ ∥∥(WDP )†∥∥ | 1√
αri
− 1√
αri,DP
| (67)
For this we frequently need to bound the following:
• ∥∥µ¯i − µ¯DPi ∥∥
• ∥∥W † − (WDP )†∥∥
• ∥∥(WDP )†∥∥
• | 1√
αri
− 1√
αri,DP
|
• |α¯i − α¯DPi |
We point out the following facts before preceding:
• | 1√
αri
− 1√
αri,DP
| ≤ | (α0+2)
2
√
(α0+1)α0
α¯i − (α0+2)
2
√
(α0+1)α0
α¯DPi | ≤ (α0+2)2√(α0+1)α0 |α¯i − α¯
DP
i |
• ∥∥(WT )†∥∥ ≤√σ1(Mˆ2)
• 1√
αri
= (α0+2)
2
√
(α0+1)α0
α¯i ≤ (α0+2)
2
√
(α0+1)α0
σ1(T̂ )
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I.1 Perturbation on Mˆ2 , Mˆ3 Config. 1 (e3, e4, e8): Proof for Theorem 10
Similar to the perturbation on (e6, e8). We have that
∥∥W † − (WDP )†∥∥ ≤
√
σ1(Mˆ2) ‖E8,G‖
σk(Mˆ2)
(68)
∥∥(WDP )†∥∥ ≤√σ1(Mˆ2) + ‖E8,G‖ (69)
Now the perturbed tensor can be represented as MˆDP3 = Mˆ3 + E3,G, where E3,G is symmetric Gaussian noise that
has been added to the original tensor. Similar to the sensitivity analysis for the whitened tensor, we have that the error
Φ can be bounded as follows:
‖Φ‖2 =
∥∥∥Mˆ3(Wˆ , Wˆ , Wˆ )− MˆDP3 (WDP ,WDP ,WDP )∥∥∥
2
(70)
≤
∥∥∥Mˆ3∥∥∥ ∥∥W −WDP∥∥3 + ‖E3,G‖ ∥∥WDP∥∥ (71)
Following an analysis similar to bounding
∥∥W † − (WDP )†∥∥, we get that ∥∥W † − (WDP )†∥∥ ≤ ‖E8,G‖
σk(Mˆ2)
√
σk(Mˆ2)
2
. Ac-
cording to 36 we have that with high probability ‖E3,G‖ = O(
√
d∆3τǫ3,δ3). We note the following
∥∥µ¯i − µ¯DPi ∥∥2 ≤
2
√
k‖Φ‖
γs
using the simultaneous power iteration of [23]. Similarly we have |α¯i − α¯DPi | ≤ 2
√
k‖Φ‖
γs
and that | 1√
αri
−
1√
αri,DP
| ≤ (α0+2)
2
√
(α0+1)α0
2
√
k‖Φ‖
γs
. This leads to
∥∥µi − µDPi ∥∥2 ≤ (α0+2)2√(α0+1)α0σ1(T̂ )
√
σ1(Mˆ2)
2
√
k‖Φ‖
γs
+ (α0+2)
2
√
(α0+1)α0
σ1(T̂ )
√
σ1(Mˆ2)
σk(Mˆ2)
‖E8,G‖+√
σ1(Mˆ2) + ‖E8,G‖ (α0+2)
2
√
(α0+1)α0
2
√
k‖Φ‖
γs
.
Based on the bound on ‖Φ‖ we have with high probability ∥∥µi − µDPi ∥∥2 = O(√σ1(Mˆ2)kγs (( √dNσk(Mˆ2)3/2 τǫ4,δ4)3 +√
d
Nσk(Mˆ2)3/2
τǫ3,δ3) +
√
σ1(Mˆ2)d
σk(Mˆ2)N
τǫ8,δ8 +
√
σ1(Mˆ2) +
√
d
N τǫ8,δ8
√
k
γs
[
(
√
d
Nσk(Mˆ2)
τǫ4,δ4)
3 +
√
d
Nσk(Mˆ2)3/2
τǫ3,δ3
]
).
I.2 Perturbation on T̂ and Mˆ2 Config. 2(e6, e8): Proof for Theorem 11
This configuration has two properties: the noise level introduced is low because the whitening step reduces the tensor
dimension from Mˆ3 ∈ Rd×d×d to T̂ = Mˆ3(Wˆ , Wˆ , Wˆ ) ∈ Rk×k×k . However, even though the dimension of the
tensor is reduced, unless the whitening tensor (resulting from eigendecomposition over Mˆ2) is stable, the sensitivity
of the whitened tensor is not necessarily low.
Note that the sensitivity of Mˆ2 falls with
1
N (Theorem 4). Therefore, we expect the sensitivity of Mˆ3(Wˆ , Wˆ , Wˆ ) to
drop with an increasing number of records. As Theorem 5 states,∆T̂ = O(
k3/2
Nσ
3/2
k
(Mˆ2)
), if∆2 ≤ σk(Mˆ2)−σk+1(Mˆ2).
Thus, given the spectral gap requirement, the sensitivity of the whitened tensor is∆T̂ .
Mˆ2 is used to generate both the whitening and unwhitening matrix, and unlike input perturbation, the sensitivity
over Mˆ2 and Mˆ3 falls as the dataset size increases (Theorem 4). However, an issue with this configuration is that
adding noise to Mˆ3 leads to higher noise build up prior to the tensor decomposition. Note that by (36) w.h.p the
norm of the error is O(
√
dσ), with σ being the variance of the noise (this bound would be
√
kσ if the noise is added
to a symmetric tensor of size k). Tensor decomposition methods, in particular [23] require the spectral norm of the
perturbation to the tensor to be lower than a certain threshold. Following arguments similar to [24], the spectral norm
of the error is O(
√
d
Nǫ3
) and should be below
√
k
γsσk(T̂ )
. Thus ǫ3 should satisfy ǫ3 = Ω(
√
kd
γsσk(T̂ )N
) to establish utility
guarantees for tensor decomposition. Following similar arguments, this time using the bound on the spectral norm of
the noisy matrices, to guarantee utility, the differentially private whiteningW and pseudo-inverseW † should be close
to their non-differentially private values, which requires both ǫ4 and ǫ8 to be Ω(
√
d
(σk(Mˆ2)−σk+1(Mˆ2)N) ). Although, the
privacy parameters have a lower bound of
√
d, the bound also falls with 1N .
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The spectral norm of the noise added to Mˆ2 can be bounded by 35 to be O(
√
d
N τǫ8,δ8) with high probability. Now,
if we have N = Ω(
√
dτǫ8,δ8
σk(Mˆ2)−σk+1(Mˆ2) ), then with w.h.p we have that ‖E8,G‖ ≤
σk(Mˆ2)−σk+1(Mˆ2)
2 , where ‖E8,G‖ is
the spectral norm of the Gaussian matrix. This condition enables us to bound
∥∥W † − (WDP )†∥∥, in a manner similar
to establishing the bounds between ‖W −W ′‖ in 28. Following a similar analysis, given that
WT (Mˆ2)kW = I, (72)
WT,DP (Mˆ2 + E8,G)kW
DP = I, (73)
WT (Mˆ2 + E8,G)kW = ADA
T , (74)
we have that
∥∥W † − (WDP )†∥∥ ≤ ∥∥W †∥∥ ‖I −D‖. We know that ∥∥W †∥∥ ≤ 1√
σk(Mˆ2)
and ‖I −D‖ can be bounded
as follows:
‖I −D‖ ≤ ∥∥I −ADAT ∥∥
≤
∥∥∥WT (Mˆ2)kW −WT (Mˆ2 + E8,G)kW∥∥∥
≤ ‖W‖2
∥∥∥(Mˆ2)k − (Mˆ2 + E8,G)k∥∥∥
≤ ‖W‖2 ‖E8,G‖
≤ ‖E8,G‖
σk(Mˆ2)
This leads to
∥∥W † − (WDP )†∥∥ ≤ √σ1(Mˆ2)‖E8,G‖
σk(Mˆ2)
.
Moreover, it is immediate by Weyl’s theorem that
∥∥(WDP )†∥∥ ≤√σ1(Mˆ2 + E8,G) ≤√σ1(Mˆ2) + ‖E8,G‖.
Finally, by the results of simultaneous power iteration (with an argument similar to Theorem 6), ifN is sufficiently
large, we have that
∥∥µ¯i − µ¯DPi ∥∥ ≤ 2√k‖E6,G‖γs where E6,G is the Gaussian tensor added to the whitened tensor ∆T̂ .
An identical bound is established for the eigenvalues, i.e. |α¯i − α¯DPi | ≤ 2
√
k‖E6,G‖
γs
.
Now we can state the utility:
∥∥µi − µDPi ∥∥ ≤ (α0 + 2)
2
√
(α0 + 1)α0
σ1(T̂ )
√
σ1(Mˆ2)
2
√
k ‖E6,G‖
γs
+
(α0 + 2)
2
√
(α0 + 1)α0
σ1(T̂ )
√
σ1(Mˆ2)
σk(Mˆ2)
‖E8,G‖
+
(α0 + 2)
2
√
(α0 + 1)α0
√
σ1(Mˆ2) + ‖E8,G‖2
√
k ‖E6,G‖
γs
(75)
We note that w.h.p we have the following bounds on spectral norms of noisy Gaussian matrix and noisy Gaussian
tensor. In particular, ‖E6,G‖ = O( k2
Nσ˜
3/2
k
τǫ6,δ6) and ‖E8,G‖ = O(
√
d
N τǫ8,δ8). This leads to the following utility
∥∥µi − µDPi ∥∥ = O(
√
σ1(Mˆ2)k2.5
γsNσ˜
3/2
k
τǫ6,δ6 +
√
σ1(Mˆ2)d
σk(Mˆ2)N
τǫ8,δ8 +
√
σ1(Mˆ2) +
√
d
N
τǫ8,δ8
k2.5τǫ6,δ6
γsNσ˜
3/2
k
).
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I.3 Perturbation on the output of tensor decomposition µ¯i,α¯i and Mˆ2 Config. 3 (e7, e8):
Proof for Theorem 12
This configuration shares edge 8 with the previous. This enables us to borrow the same bounds for the pseudo-inverse
W †. Specifically, we have:
∥∥W † − (WDP )†∥∥ ≤
√
σ1(Mˆ2) ‖E8,G‖
σk(Mˆ2)∥∥(WDP )†∥∥ ≤√σ1(Mˆ2) + ‖E8,G‖
In this method, noise is added directly to the eigenvectors and eigenvalues resulting from the tensor decomposition.
Therefore, we have:
µ¯DPi = µ¯i + Y, Y ∼ N (0,∆2ǫ,δIk)
α¯DPi = α¯i + ni, ni ∼ N (0,∆2ǫ,δ)
where∆ǫ,δ =
√
2k∆
T̂
γs
τǫ7,δ7 with τǫ7,δ7 =
√
2ln(1.25/δ7)
ǫ7
. This leads to the following bound:
∥∥µi − µDPi ∥∥ ≤ (α0 + 2)
2
√
(α0 + 1)α0
σ1(T̂ )
√
σ1(Mˆ2) ‖Y ‖+
(α0 + 2)
2
√
(α0 + 1)α0
σ1(T̂ )
√
σ1(Mˆ2)
σk(Mˆ2)
‖E8,G‖+
(α0 + 2)
2
√
(α0 + 1)α0
√
σ1(Mˆ2) + ‖E8,G‖|ni|
As before w.h.p ‖E6,G‖ = O(
√
d
N τǫ6,δ6).The following bounds hold on ‖Y ‖ and |ni|, because they are a Gaussian
vector and variable. In particular, w.h.p. ‖Y ‖ = O( k5/2
Nσ˜
3/2
k γ˜s
τǫ7,δ7) and |ni| = O( k
2
Nσ˜
3/2
k γ˜s
τǫ7,δ7). This leads to the
following utility: O(
√
σ1(Mˆ2)k2.5
γ˜sNσ˜
3/2
k
τǫ7,δ7 +
√
σ1(Mˆ2)d
σk(Mˆ2)N
τǫ8,δ8 +
√
σ1(Mˆ2) +
√
d
N τǫ8,δ8
k2τǫ7,δ7
γ˜sNσ˜
3/2
k
).
I.4 Perturbation on the final output µi, αi Config. 4 (e9): Proof for Theorem 13
In this configuration, we add noise proportional to the output’s sensitive
µDPi = µi + Z, where Z ∼ N (0,∆2ǫ,δIk)
where∆ǫ,δ = ∆µτǫ9,δ9 , with τǫ9,δ9 =
√
2ln(1.25/δ9)
ǫ9
. Similar to the previous analysis, since Z is Gaussian, then w.h.p.
‖Z‖ = O(
√
dσ1(Mˆ2)k
2
Nγ˜sσ˜
3/2
k
). We have the utility O(
√
σ1(Mˆ2)dk
2
Nγ˜sσ˜
3/2
k
τǫ9,δ9).
J K. Evaluation
Recall the grid search process used to choose the best configuration for a particular ǫ. For a particular edge set, we vary
the ǫ parameter across each edge (making sure they still sum to the same composite ǫ) and choosing the combination
that yields the maximum likelihood. We do this across every possible configuration, and choose the configuration
which yields the highest likelihood to the original output. However, this approach leaks the data likelihood. In order
to make the max likelihood computation differentially private, we perturb the sufficient statistics of the data. The
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sufficient statistic necessarily contains all information to compute the likelihood estimate, so having a differentially
private sufficient statistic would guarantee a differentially private likelihood computation.
Consider the sufficient statistics matrix S, which isK × d (for k topics and a vocabulary of size d). Then, for each
entry svk, the sensitivity△svk is bounded above by dN . Then, using the gaussian mechanism, we can add noise to each
entry: svk = s
v
k + G(△svk , ǫ, δ), where G denotes the gaussian mechanism. Then S is (ǫ, δ) differentially private, and
can be used to compute differentially private likelihoods.
K L. Experiments on Wikipedia Dataset
Topic # Top Words
1 ’air’, ’th’, ’force’, ’squadron’, ’special’, ’operations’, ’test’, ’august’, ’december’, ’mission’
2 ’music’, ’composition’, ’kaufmann’, ’works’, ’dieter’, ’vienna’, ’acoustic’, ’electro’, ’des’, ’president’
3 ’river’, ’barnstaple’, ’yeo’, ’taw’, ’flooding’, ’tributary’, ’rivers’, ’south’, ’devon’, ’flows’
Table 2: Top words in Wikipedia Dataset recovered from our DP algorithm with ǫ = 1. Note that the topics shown
here are not cherry picked but randomly selected.
L M. Some Useful Identities and Theorems
Identity 29 (Square of Sum).
( N∑
i=1
ai
)2
=
N∑
i=1
a2i +
N,N∑
i=1,j=1
i6=j
aiaj
Identity 30 (Cube of Sum).
( N∑
i=1
ai
)3
=
N∑
i=1
a3i + 3
N,N∑
i=1,j=1
i6=j
a2i aj +
N,N,N∑
i=1,j=1,k=1
i6=j,j 6=k,k 6=i
ajajak
Theorem 31 (Weyl’s theorem; Theorem 4.11, p. 204 in [19]). . Let A,E be givenm× n matrices withm ≥ n, then
max
i∈[n]
|σi(A) − σi(A+ E)| ≤ ‖E‖2
Theorem 32 (Wedin’s theorem; Theorem 4.11, p. 204 in [19]). Let A,E ∈ Rm,n with m ≥ n and Aˆ = A + E,
the following be the singular value decomposition of A
UT1UT2
UT3
A [V1 V2] . =
Σ1 00 Σ2
0 0
 . Let Aˆ have a similar
decomposition, with (Uˆ1, Uˆ2, Uˆ3, Σˆ1, Σˆ2, Vˆ1, Vˆ2). And let Φ is the matrix of canonical angels between range(U1) and
range(Uˆ1) and Θ is the matrix of canonical angels between range(V1) and range(Vˆ1). If there exists an δ, α > 0 such
thatminiσi(Σˆ1) ≥ α+ δ andmaxiσi(Σ2), then
max(‖Φ‖2 , ‖Θ‖2) ≤
‖E‖2
δ
.
Theorem 33 (Bound on the norm of a Gaussian Random Variable). Let n be a Gaussian N (0, σ). Then P[|n| ≤ t] ≥
1− 2e−t
2
2σ2
Theorem 34 (Bound on the norm of a Gaussian Vector). Let Y ∼ N (0, σIk), then P[‖Y ‖22 ≥ σ2(k+2
√
kt+ 2t)] ≤
e−t.
32
Proof. The proof is immediate from Theorem 2.1 in [13] with A = I, µ = 0.
Theorem 35 (Bound on the spectral norm of a Gaussian Matrix [21]). LetE ∈ Rd×d be a symmetric Gaussian matrix
with elements sampled iid from N (0, σ), then P[‖E‖2 = O(
√
dσ)] ≥ 1− negl(d).
Theorem 36 (Bound on the spectral norm of a Gaussian Tensor [22]). LetE be aKth order tensor with eachEi1,...,iK
be sampled i.i.d. from a Gaussian N (0, σ), then P[‖E‖2 ≤
√
8σ2(
∑K
i=1 di) ln(2K/K0) + ln(2/δ)] ≥ 1 − δ, where
K0 = ln(3/2). Note by extension the bound also holds if the tensor is symmetric as well.
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